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ABSTRACT
With China's miraculous economic development in recent decades, it is difficult for traditional theories, either 
communist or liberal ones, to accurately reflect the reality of reform in China. Concepts such as “unwritten 
constitution” or “living constitution” have been studied in the context of China. However, these western concepts 
are unable to provide a holistic view of China's Constitution, especially after 1978. China's Constitution, centered 
on the Communist Party and the State, has been largely transformed since then. This article goes beyond the 
liberal approach and argues that a dual constitution has sprouted up in China, within which the Party's 
Constitution attempts to keep pace with that of the State. Specifically, the Party has been endeavoring to 
integrate itself into the State through political conventions and self-normalization. The dual constitution is unique 
in the sense that it departs from the model of Mao Zedong; it deviates from that of the Soviet Union and it does not 
follow the formalistic approach of Western countries in defining the nature of a constitution. This suggests that 
the status quo of China's regime and the direction of its constitutional reform can only be clarified by 
understanding the evolution of the dual constitution.
KEYWORDS
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RESUMEN
Dado el asombroso desarrollo económico en las recientes décadas, es difícil para las teorías tradicionales, 
tanto las comunistas como las liberales, reflejar la realidad exacta de reforma en China. Conceptos como 
“Constitución no escrita” o “Constitución vigente” han sido estudiados en el contexto de China. No obstante, 
estos conceptos occidentales no muestran una mirada holística de la Constitución de China, especialmente 
después de 1978. La constitución de China, centrada en el Partido Comunista y en el Estado, ha sido 
transformada en gran medida. 
* The earlier version of this article was presented at the Inaugural Conference of International Society of Public Law on “Rethinking 
the Boundaries of Public Law and Public Space” held at Florence on 27 June 2014, and was accepted by the World Congress of 
Constitutional Law for workshop discussion on “The Constitution and Illiberal Democracy” at Oslo on June 18, 2014. 
12755
Revista Jurídica , Vol. 15 pp. 155-177 /Piélagus  ISSN 1657-6799 - Julio a Diciembre de 2016 / Neiva (Huila) Colombia
Recibido: 12/03/2016          Aprobado: 03/10/2016
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.25054/16576799.1293
Este artículo va más allá de los enfoques liberales y discute que una constitución dual ha brotado en China, con 
la cual la Constitución de los partidos busca mantener el ritmo con el Estado. Específicamente, el partido ha 
intentado integrarse al Estado a través de convenciones políticas y de una auto-normalización. La constitución 
dual es única en el sentido de que parte del modelo de Mao Zedong, desviándose de la Unión Soviética y 
dejando de seguir un enfoque formalista de los países occidentales para definir la naturaleza de una 
constitución. Esto sugiere que el status quo del régimen de China y de la dirección de su propia reforma 
constitucional puede ser aclarado entendiendo la evolución de la constitución dual. 
PALABRAS CLAVE
Constitución de China; Partido comunista; Estado Comunista; Evolución de la constitución; dualidad de la 
constitución. 
INTRODUCTION
The National People's Congress of the People's 
Republic of China is the highest organ of state power. 
Its permanent body is the Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress.
--Article 57 of the Constitution of the 
People's Republic of China 1982
The Communist Party of China leads the people in 
promoting socialist democracy … It upholds and 
improves the system of people's congresses, the 
system of multiparty cooperation and political 
consultation under its leadership.
--Excerpted from the General Program, the 
Constitution of the Communist Party of China 
1There is no doubt that China , as a developing 
country, is still on a journey towards constitutio-
nalism. However, China's efforts should not be 
underestimated. These can be seen, for example, in 
the way that China became the world's second 
2largest economy in 2010 . This leads to the argument 
that it is time for China to tell its own story: According 
to Sizhuo (2010) “the Chinese have the ability to 
create a great story. They are also definitely able to 
learn how to tell their own story, allowing China's story 
to spread to the world and emotionally move it”. 
Regarding China's economic transition, Justin Yifu 
Lin (cited in Callahan, W., 2013) visualizes that an 
emerging “China model” of economic development 
that combines authoritarian state governance and 
free market capitalism is taking shape. The proposed 
model could explain, to a certain extent, the rapid 
economic development that has taken place in a 
reformed China since 1978. However, it is highly 
controversial whether “China's constitutionalism” is 
also taking shape. 
Recently, some Chinese left-wing thinkers, who 
celebrate state powers, have argued that 
constitutionalism is an idea that only belongs to the 
West and is inapplicable to China because its 
intention is to subvert the leadership of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) and socialist 
sovereignty (Xiaoqing, Y., 2013, pp. 29-31). In 
contrast, Chinese liberals hold that constitutionalism 
is the common achievement of liberal civilization and 
should be viewed as a goal that the CPC should 
pursue in the future (Dayuan, H., 2012, pp. 40-43.). At 
least such debate proves that the CPC, as the ruling 
party, is not ruling the country on the basis of 
constitutionalism either in the eyes of advocates or 
opponents (Yongnian, Z., 2013). The most spirited 
1- For the purpose of this article, China refers to the People's Republic of China (PRC), excluding the Hong Kong Special Administration 
Region, Macau Special Administrative Region and the territory of Taiwan. Transitional China starts from 1978 when Deng Xiaoping 
began to adopt the opening-up policy and implement all-round economic reform in China. 
2 - China, as a transitional country, still faces many pressing problems to deal with, just like other transitional countries. 
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debate over the future of China's constitutionalism 
either condemns the Western model thoroughly, 
denying the validity of the multi-party system and 
democracy or praises the current communist China in 
the belief that China is forming a better model than 
those of Western countries. Some recent research 
even shows by partial data that nearly 70% of people 
in China think that the government is democratic and 
3follows good governance . During this seemingly 
prosperous period, it is understandable that many 
new voices have emerged to propose a multitude of 
different dreams, possibilities and futures for China. 
Admittedly, China's recent success, especially when 
contrasted with the continuing crisis in the West, is 
leading many intellectuals to think in new ways about 
China's future and the world's future. Nonetheless, 
very few details are clear about how China's 
constitutional regime has been evolving in reality. 
Having said this, some authors have attempted to 
assess the current Chinese regime in order to form a 
suitable constitutional theory for China beyond the 
4Western standards . A typical example is the 
“unwritten constitution” constructed to expound 
China's political regime, because the written 
Constitution is incapable of describing the reality 
(Shigong, J., 2009, pp. 805-840). In fact, such an 
endeavor merely employs but does not clarify this 
concept, which originates in Britain and, therefore, in 
a completely different context (Yongkun, Z., 2011, pp. 
26-33). In addition, some early scholarship attempted 
to explore China's constitutional development from a 
non-liberal perspective, centered, in particular, on the 
development of the National People's Congress 
(NPC) as a way of tracking the emergence of China's 
constitutionalism but this has generally been 
dismissed by liberal constitutionalists (Dowdle, M., 
(2002). Furthermore, some scholars are currently 
trying to use the concept of a “living constitution”       
to move beyond an analysis of the Constitution as a 
formal text and to shed light on the de facto 
5constitutional order in China . Even though they 
recognize the greater importance of the CPC or NPC 
in China's constitutional development from a non-
liberal perspective, fewer details are given in terms of 
the interdependence of the CPC and the State, a 
relationship which has evolved for decades with a 
different vision from the traditional Party-State which 
simply implies that the Party commands, controls and 
integrates all other political organizations and 
6institutions in China .  
Building on the current scholarship on China's 
Constitution, this article first elucidates why the 
concept of an “unwritten constitution” is misused   
and not suitable for China. It then moves on to show 
that China has been building a “dual constitution” 
structure comprised of the Party and the State 
interdependently since 1978. More specifically, it 
expounds (1) how the State under the dual 
constitution has been strengthened; (2) how the Party 
under the dual constitution has been normalized in 
practice; and (3) how the two evolve interdependently 
in reality. Finally, it suggests that China should orient 
and implement its constitutional reform incrementally, 
based on its de facto dual constitution. 
1. CHINA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION?
The concept of an “unwritten constitution” was 
originally proposed by Dicey in order to interpret the 
situation in the British state which at present does not 
have a formal written constitution. However, in the 
context of China, it is well-known that the Chinese 
3 - This survey was conducted by Prof Kang, L., (2013). “Is China Dream  a Good Example?” at Duke University
4 - For recent discussion on Chinese constitutional theory, see Shigong, J., (2014). “Chinese-Style Constitutionalism: On Backer's 
Chinese Party-State Constitutionalism” 40 (2) Modern China 133-167 and  Backer, L., (2014). “Toward a Robust Theory of the Chinese 
Constitutional State: Between Formalism and Legitimacy in Jiang Shigong's Constitutionalism” 40 (2) Modern China, pp.168-195.
5 -  Some scholars use the concept “living constitution” to expound China's constitutional practice in an empirical approach. See Xin, 
H., (2012) “The Party's Leadership as a Living Constitution in China” 1 Hong Kong Law Journal 73-94; Peerenboom, R., (2012) “Social 
Foundations of China's Living Constitution” in Ginsburg, T., (2012) ed., Comparative Constitutional Design (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), pp 155-159. 
6 - It holds that the Party-state, or “partocracy,” accurately captures China's political reality. See Xia, M., “The Communist Party of 
China and the -Party-State-”. 
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7 - As Dicey notes, the whole of our parliamentary procedure is nothing but a mass of conventional law; it is, however, recorded in 
written or printed rules. Ibid.
8 - Dicey clearly states these two guiding principles which truly underlie the English polity. See Dicey, A., (1959). Law of the 
Constitution (London: Macmillan Education Ltda.), pp 470-472.
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legal system does not function completely according 
to the current written Constitution and there is a wide 
gap between the Constitution on paper and actual 
constitutional practice. Therefore, China has been  
accused of being an authoritarian or even totalitarian 
regime with a Constitution that is something of a fake 
or is widely abused. Nonetheless, if the written 
Constitution is unable to describe the Chinese legal 
system, then by what constitutional rules does the 
regime operate? To answer this question, Jiang has 
elaborated the concept of an “unwritten constitution”. 
His argument is mainly grounded on the two types    
of rules elaborated by Dicey. One is “the law of the 
constitution”, in the strictest sense, since these      
are rules which are enforced by the courts and the 
other is the “conventions of the constitution”, which 
consists of conventions, understandings, habits, or 
practice. He also refers to Wheare's statement as 
collateral evidence. 
We are thinking of the distinction between those rules 
regulating a government – mostly rules of law – which 
are written down either in a Constitution or in some 
act of parliament or other legal document, and those 
other rules, mainly the customs and convention and 
usages regulating the government, which have 
usually not been precisely formulated and put in 
writing (Wheare, K., 1951).
Consequently, he infers that the existence and 
functioning of China's Constitution can be illustrated 
by different unwritten forms, such as the Party's 
Constitution, constitutional conventions, constitutio-
nal doctrine, and constitutional statutes. However, as 
shown below, his deliberate misinterpretation of 
“unwritten constitution” can be quite frustrating. 
Although Dicey puts forward two types of rules which 
make up constitutional law in England. However, it is 
clear that the “conventions” here are not formal laws 
even if they may regulate the conduct of some 
members of the sovereign power. For example, “the 
King must assent to, or (as it is inaccurately 
expressed) cannot 'veto' any bill passed by the two 
Houses of Parliament;” “the House of Lords does not 
originate any money bill.” A point in common is that if 
any or all of them were broken, no court would take 
notice of their violation (Dicey, A., 1915). Moreover, 
Dicey emphasizes that the distinction between laws 
and conventions is not the same as the difference 
between “written law” (or statute law) and “unwritten 
law” (or common law). Thus, some laws of the 
constitution which were at one time unwritten or 
common law may get legislated into written or statute 
law. On the other hand, the conventions of the 
constitution cannot be recorded in the statute book, 
7though they may be formally reduced to writing . 
Constitutional convention could be considered as a 
part of constitutional law in a broad sense and this 
implies that its status is equal with the laws of a 
constitution. However, the constitutional convention 
must be subject to the laws of the constitution 
(Freeman, E., 1876), according to the principles of 
the sovereignty of Parliament and the “rule of law” in 
8Britain . Dicey clearly states that:  
Three such guiding principles gradually become 
apparent. They are, first, the legislative sovereignty of 
Parliament; secondly, the universal rule or supremacy 
throughout the constitution of ordinary law; and thirdly 
(though here we tread on more doubtful and 
speculative ground), the dependence in the last resort 
of the conventions upon the law of the constitution 
(Dicey, A., 1982).
Nonetheless, China's written Constitution, in 
practice, is often dismissed as merely a “rubber 
stamp” that has not fulfilled its function as prescribed 
by the Constitution. Jiang states that:
The Constitution of the PRC clearly stipulates a system 
of people's congresses based on the Soviet model, 
which is itself similar to the British parliamentary 
system. The NPC and its Standing Committee, as the 
organs that exercise sovereign power, are to possess 
9 - For more details about the status of China's courts, see Peerenboom, R., (2010). Judicial Independence in China Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
10 -  Shigong, J.,  argues that the Constitution of the PRC clearly stipulates a system of people's congresses based on the Soviet model, 
which is itself similar to the British parliamentary system. p 23.
11 - Ibid., pp 23-24.
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a wide range of powers and the highest political 
authority … Thus, what constitutes China as a nation-
state is not the system of people's congresses 
established by the written constitution, but the 
leadership of the CPC within the system of multiparty 
cooperation that was formed during the revolution, 
promulgated in the preamble of the written 
constitution, and affirmed in political practice 
(Shigong, J., 2014).
Hence, he argues that the CPC leadership could be 
considered as the “unwritten constitution” in China, 
given that the written Constitution is malfunctioning  
in practice. Here, the concept of an “unwritten 
constitution” is used arbitrarily. First, its reference     
to Dicey's work is misused. As mentioned above, 
Dicey strictly refers to the “constitutional convention” 
and “unwritten law”, not “unwritten constitution”. 
Evidently, constitutional convention, subject to the 
laws of the constitution, is different from the 
“unwritten constitution” in China where it means    
that the CPC's leadership could prevail over the 
written Constitution. Secondly, in considering the 
constitutional convention Dicey suggests that       
this consists of “customs which (whatever their 
historical origin) are at the present day maintained  
for the sake of ensuring the supremacy of the House 
of Commons, and ultimately, through the elective 
House of Commons, of the nation.” In contrast, in   
the context of China, the CPC's convention, to a 
certain extent, is able to prevail over the “people's 
sovereignty” as entrenched in the written 
Constitution. Third, it is evident that the “unwritten 
law” is a concept elaborated in common law 
jurisdiction, and it is doubtful whether it can be 
appropriately applied in socialist countries like  
China. Furthermore, at the institutional level, the 
evolution of “unwritten constitution” is grounded in 
Britain's parliamentary sovereignty and the “rule of 
law” principle in which the courts are the cornerstone 
for the development of common law. China's courts, 
in contrast, are still struggling to gain judicial 
9independence . As it is widely accepted that China is 
still an authoritarian country under the rule of the 
CPC, it would not be fair to simply analyze China 
within such a narrow scope, purely based on a 
10“similarity” with the British parliamentary system . 
Therefore, the concept of an “unwritten constitution” 
which is derived from the British experience is 
misused in the context of China, and is unable to 
reveal China's changing regime in this era of reform. 
2. EMERGENCE OF A DUAL CONSTITUTION
The concept of “unwritten constitution” cannot fully 
capture China's political reality, however, it grasps 
the core of China's real polity partly by saying that 
“the fundamental law of China is the leadership of the 
CPC with multiparty cooperation, and it is that 
fundamental law which is the foundation of all of 
China's constitutional institutions and, finally, that 
sovereignty in China is made up of two bodies: the 
11CPC and the NPC.”
It is widely acknowledged that China's Constitution   
is not enforceable judicially as it stipulates that      
only the NPC exercises the power to amend the 
Constitution and supervise the enforcement of the 
Constitution, and only the Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress (NPCSC) can interpret 
the Constitution and supervise its enforcement, 
according to Article 62 and 67 of the Constitution. 
Moreover, in 2009, the Supreme People's Court 
(SPC) issued the Provisions on Citation of Legal 
Documents as Laws and Regulations in the 
Judgments, and this excludes the Constitution as a 
basis for judicial decisions. In this regard, in order to 
understand China's constitutional regime it is 
necessary to move beyond the traditional judicial 
review model that mainly focuses on the written 
Constitution. The argument made by Jiang has 
largely shifted attention away from the traditional 
12 - Ibid., p 24.
13 - The case is similar at the turn of the century when parliament was implanted in China in an attempt to save the empire when 
imperial rule was at jeopardy due to the invasion from abroad and the threat of revolution and constitutionalism movement from 
within (Yang, Y., 1936). 
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constitutional studies in China which is focused on 
the written Constitution and which acknowledge the 
CPC's substantial involvement, since it is not a gene-
ral party in the sense of political association but a 
political cornerstone in China's polity. As Jiang puts it: 
The former [CPC] embodies the fundamental law that 
acts as the absolute constitution; the latter [NPC] 
embodies the fundamental law codified in the written 
constitution. Accordingly, there are two types of 
representatives of the people: the first are the CPC and
other democratic parties, whose members are social 
elites in every field and every class, and who enjoy the 
support of the masses by virtue of their political ideals, 
historical mission, and class interests; the second is 
the NPC, whose members are democratically elected 
12through a legal process.  
Therefore, the concept of an “unwritten constitution” 
which is derived from the British experience is 
misused in the context of China, and is unable to 
reveal China's changing regime in this era of reform. 
It is a fact that the key element of China's Constitution 
has two parts and is different from the models of other 
liberal countries. Nonetheless, it is untenable to take 
the “is” proposition as an “ought” one, i.e. the fact that 
the CPC's leadership is absolute does not mean that 
it ought to be absolute and become the fundamental 
law in China. Admittedly, this may be an effective  
way to legitimize the CPC's ruling based on the 
status quo; but the “intention” to maintain the CPC's 
legitimacy by deriving “ought” from “is” is questio-
nable. In addition, it does not reveal the substantial 
relationship between the CPC and NPC, and under 
what conditions such dual mechanism operates in 
practice. 
Empirically, there is no doubt that both the CPC     
and the NPC have played a crucial role in China's 
transition. To a certain extent, China resembles  
other countries if the constitution beyond the written 
Constitution is considered. As Tushnet states that:
In the context of the US, a constitutional order is  
more like a small-c British constitution than it is like 
the document called the United States Constitution. 
Moreover, just as scholars of constitutionalism    
have found it productive to think about the British 
constitution, it is productive to think about a constitu-
tional order that goes beyond judicial doctrine and the 
written Constitution to encompass relatively stable 
political arrangements and guiding principles 
(Tushnet, M., 2003). 
Similarly, it will be more productive to think about 
China's small-c constitution which is incapable of 
being fully disclosed by the written Constitution.
Essentially, China's Constitution has been evolving 
under a dual structure consisting of the Party 
Constitution and the State Constitution, both of which 
are indispensable and cannot be underestimated. 
Consequently, the issues of (1) how the dual 
constitutional has emerged and (2) under what 
condition the Party and the State under the dual 
constitution are interdependent, need to be 
addressed. 
2.1 Strengthening of the State Constitution
Historically, China mainly transplanted the political 
system of the Soviet Union after its establishment    
in 1949, and adopted mostly legal nihilism under    
the era of Mao (Tsou, T., 2012). The former Vice-
President of China, Liu Shaoqi, once said to a 
constitutional scholar that “it is meaningless to    
study constitutional law in China” (Xinwang, S., 
2011). However, this statement is particularly ironic 
given that he later sought to claim his constitutional 
rights when he was being persecuted during the 
Cultural Revolution. Needless to say, the People's 
Congress system and the State Constitution at       
this time were merely a “rubber stamp” to serve      
the empire or a tool to strengthen the leader's 
13charismatic authority . Thus, under Mao's totalitarian 
regime, there was no doubt that the society was 
14 - The 7th Decision of the Supreme People's Court to Repeal Relevant Judicial Interpretations Released before 2007, 18 December, 
2008. 
15 - The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, art 57.
16 - Ibid., art 62.
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subject to the strict and all-round control of the CPC. 
And it was no surprise that the 3rd NPC fell into a 
state of paralysis for almost ten years which means 
that the provisions embedded in the Constitution but 
subject to the will of CPC could not be implemented 
strictly. 
Over the past three decades, China has undergone 
unprecedented economic and legal reform and has 
taken a different road towards constitutionalism. 
Learning from previous lessons, the Party has 
realized the importance of the “rule of law” principle. 
The newly adopted Constitution in 1982 has been 
playing an increasingly significant role in this. For 
example, it expressly limits the tenure of the State 
President and Vice-President, the Premier and      
the Vice-Premiers, and the Chairman and Vice-
Chairmen of the NPCSC, and the President of the 
SPC and the Procurator-General of the Supreme 
People's Procuratorate (SPP) to two consecutive 
five-year terms, a model followed by virtually all local 
governments. These term limits have been applied 
by the party leadership ever since Deng Xiaoping 
initiated the cadre retirement reform in 1982 
(Qianfan, Z., 2010). It is fair to say that relevant 
provisions have been enforced strictly, particularly in 
regard to the state structure that forms such a central 
part of the Constitution. 
However, by Western standards, many authors 
condemn China's Constitution as simply a “facade” 
because it lacks any meaningful judicial mecha-  
nism for implementation and is left unguarded 
against official violations (Qianfan, Z., 2010). This    
is especially so after the rise and fall of Qi Yuling v. 
Chen Xiaoqi et al (Zhiwei, T., 2010), which appears  
to give no hope for the future of the judicial 
enforcement of China's Constitution. In 2001, the 
SPC's interpretation of constitutional provisions in 
relation to Qi Yuling opened up the possibility – 
greeted enthusiastically – for the judicial application 
of China's Constitution in deciding cases. By the end 
of 2008, however, this path was foreclosed by the 
SPC itself when it announced that judicial interpret-
ation had lost its legal effect. It has been argued     
that judicial implementation of the Constitution was 
viewed as a potential threat to the party leadership, 
and there were rumors that the SPC had circulated an 
internal directive forbidding the courts from following 
the Qi Yuling decision. This might explain the de facto 
demise of that decision's potential for judicializing  
the Constitution. In December 2008, the SPC pub-
lished a document that officially voided the legal 
effect of several judicial explanations retrospectively, 
among  which Qi Yuling was the only one without 
14even a brief explanation . Thus, the critique of 
China's Constitution as merely existing to maintain 
the government's image is understandable.
This conclusion, however, is mainly drawn from a 
Western “court-centered” approach. It overlooks the 
fact that the Constitution has been strengthened and 
enforced by other state actors. In particular, the NPC, 
as the highest organ of state power stipulated by the 
15Constitution , has not ceased its operations since 
1978. During this time, the functions and powers 
exclusively owned by the NPC in accordance with the 
Constitution: to amend the Constitution; to elect the 
President and the Vice-President of China; to decide 
on the choice of the Premier of the State Council upon 
nomination by the President; to elect the Chairman of 
the Central Military Commission (CMC); to elect the 
President of the SPC; and to elect the Procurator-
General of the SPP, have never been exercised by 
16other state actors . In this regard, to say that China's 
Constitution is not justiciable does not mean that the 
Constitution could not be enforced in other ways. 
It is clear that China's Constitution adopts the 
People's Congress system as its foundation, unlike 
Western political systems, such as the parliamentary 
sovereignty in Britain or separation of powers in the 
United States. Hence, it will be more effective to 
17 - Ibid., art 61.
18 - There are several forms of supervision in practice, such as:  (1) criticism of ministry or State Council officials by deputies in small-
group meetings, (2) inspection of local government organs and economic enterprises by groups of NPCSC or NPC deputies, and (3) 
institutional oversight of subordinate administrative agencies by NPC committees. 
19 - Deputies in small-group meetings at plenary session could also criticize state officials for immorality, incompetence, and 
mistaken priorities. Ibid., p 165.
20 - NPC deputies are able to speek for regions or occupational groups and pressed for “allocation responsiveness,” so as to draw 
leadership attention to their claims and to nudge policies in a desired direction. Ibid., p 170.
21 - In fact, the rise of law making and the corresponding erosion of Party central control over the process creates a tremendous 
opportunity for that process to be opened further to broader society. When Party Centre is giving legislators fewer, more ambiguous, 
signals about its wishes, and has, in any case, substantially lowered the penalties for disobeying those wishes, the legislators will feel 
free to perform their functions.
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assess the implementation of the Constitution 
through the operation of the People's Congress 
system, not merely from the judicialization of the 
Constitution. 
The People's Congress system has been progressi-
vely strengthened over the past three decades. The 
congresses have been held routinely in accordance 
with the Constitution of 1982, namely, it meets in 
session once a year and is convened by its Standing 
17Committee . As noted by O'Brien, it would be a 
mistake to conclude that the NPC and the Chinese 
political system after 1978 still closely resemble their 
predecessors under Mao. A review of legislative 
activities will show that the NPC has come to occupy 
a new position in China, though it is still non-liberal 
(Xiaoli, Z., 2012 and O'Brien, K., 1990).
Firstly, after a lapse of two full decades, legal drafting 
resumed in 1978 and, by 2010, the NPC and NPCSC 
had passed 232 national laws. Meanwhile, local 
people's congresses passed more than 8800 local 
rules. This has formed the basis of a comprehensive 
legal system in China with a distinctive Chinese 
quality, and includes seven categories of law subjects 
covering all aspects of political, economic, cultural 
and social life (Sixi, C., 2010). The NPC has occupied 
a position at the center of a horizontally and vertically 
integrated legislative system, linked sideways to the 
State Council, ministries, and Party, and downwards 
to regions via local congresses (O'Brien, K., 1990, 
pp. 164).
Secondly, the NPC's institutional supervision has 
been strengthened. In practice, the supervision may 
be conducted by the full NPC, its committees, or 
individual deputies, and it may be directed at state 
functionaries or the institutions they head. 
Supervision may be personal and sporadic or it may 
18be institutional and regular.  
Thirdly, the deputies have been playing a more 
dominant role in each NPC session. It has been 
perceived that the incisive interpellations and angry 
deputy speeches have become a common 
occurrence at NPC sessions in the decades after 
1979. For example, deputies at the 1988 convening 
criticized Premier Li Peng's suggestion that 
intellectuals moonlight to supplement their incomes, 
saying that it was an “improper measure” that would   
interfere with teaching and research and would 
“damage long-term national interests”. Moreover, 
several deputies openly disagreed with General 
Secretary Zhao Ziyang's assessment that such a 
19policy was “necessary and possible” . The key 
difference here is that the deputies are free to argue 
as they please in their speeches and votes as long as 
they “sought truth from facts” and served the public 
20interest . Thus, as Vice Chairman of the NPC Law 
Committee Zhang Youyu once put it: 
  
Some deputies are dissatisfied with the status quo on 
work outside meetings ... and would like to do even 
more. They ask to intervene directly in government, 
judicial, and procuratorial work, or to directly handle 
mass appeals, complaints, and proposals (Youyu, Z., 
1983). 
  
Moreover, in 2005, the NPC promulgated the Proce-
dures for Handling Questions and Interpellations 
from Delegates in order to strengthen the role of 
deputies, which undoubtedly was a move towards a 
21more open and consultative system (Yan, L., 2015) . 
Voting Results of 12th National People's Congress (17th March, 2013)
Number of Deputies                                          Total: 2986; Absent: 38; Present: 2948
Source: China Daily, 17th March, 2013. 






Report on the work of the Governent 2799 111 44 4
Report on Edonomic, Social, Development 
plan
2665 221 60 2
Report on China’s Central and Local Budges 2307 509 127 5
Report on the work of the 11th National People’s 
Congress Standing Commitee
2733 160 51 4
Report on the work of the Supreme People’s 
Court
2218 605 120 5
Report on the work of the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate
2339 485 121 3
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Today it is normal for delegates to question officials 
during the session of the NPC. For example, in 2009, 
the delegates from Henan Province questiones the 
minister of  Education about the unequal distribution 
of education resources nationwide (Xiaoyun, E., 
2015). Accordingly, the voting of deputies has 
become more effective, albeit limited. In accordance 
with the State Constitution, it is the NPC deputies who 
decide the reports on the work of govenment by 
voting to reflect the degree of satisfaction. For 
example, due to the poor performance of the SPC, 
605 negative votes -the highest yet- were cast in the 
NPC session of 2013. 
Furthermore, in some areas, the single-candidate 
elections have been replaced by the competitive 
elections, and this has given deputies more freedom 
with regard to their right to vote. For instance, 161 
NPCSC members were elected from 174 nominees 
during the 2013 plenary session. Sometimes, CPC 
 
nominees may not be approved for senior positions. 
For example, in the 1995 Plenary Session, over one-
third of the deputies failed to support the CPC's 
nominee for Vice-Premier Jiang Chunyun. Over a 
quarter of the deputies also failed to support State 
Council proposals for a draft Banking Law and a draft 
Education Law (Dowdle, M., 1997). 
Comparatively, the NPC's representation mechanism 
is different from that of liberal democracies where   
the executive may strive to manipulate the legislature 
by lobbying, political canvassing, etc. However, 
essentially, as Pitkin puts it, representation entails 
regular, institutionalized responsiveness and can 
only be discussed in reference to the overall structure 
and functioning of a political system (Pitkin, H., 1967). 
It has been recognized that the representation in 
legislature, like decision-making influence, is not as 
clear-cut as it may first appear. Their idea is based on 
the observation that representatives are not the 
22 - For more details, see The Law of the People's Republic of China on the Supervision of Standing Committees of People's 
Congresses at Various Levels, promulgated by the National People's Congress Standing Committee. 
12764
Revista Jurídica , Vol. 15                                Julio a Diciembre de 2016 / Piélagus Neiva (Huila) Colombia
constituency's puppet, but human beings with      
their own consciousness. Such consciousness will 
decide, at least potentially, its role or function. They 
thus stress the deputy's role orientation rather than 
the relationship between decision-making, roll-call 
voting and the constituency's views (Eulau, H., and 
Karps, P., 1977). 
Hence, the legislator's sense of representation and 
willingness to represent clearly has a part to play      
in applying the legislature's potential capacity to  
have real influence (Hu, S., 1993). Thus, in having a 
broad horizon beyond the Western paradigm of 
representation through a multi-party system, the 
representation of legislature is by no means a 
dichotomous variable. Rather, we should be able     
to assign “points” to the various legislatures and 
place them on a continuum of representation, or at 
least put them in a broad topology according to     
their representation levels. In this sense, an NPC 
comprised of deputies also has its paradigm of 
representation, although the level may be lower than 
that of liberal democracies. As such: 
  
The existence of certain representation in non-
democratic legislature becomes understandable, and 
can be explained, and compared. It is the configura-
tion of the component aspect of representation that 
might yield viable theories of representation other than 
representative government only, in the modern 
complexity of society (Hu, S., 1993). 
  
Therefore, even though the form of representation 
may be different and the activities do not resemble 
legislative supervision as found in liberal democra-
cies, in a weakly institutionalized system with a very 
strong executive they serve similar ends (O'Brien, K., 
1990, pp. 165).
In addition, at the local level, the congress system 
has also been strengthened. The Local People's 
Congresses (LPCs) are able to turn down Party 
nominees for State leadership. A survey of 18 out of 
27 provincial LPCs around 1988 found that they 
vetoed 49 of 712 Party nominees (a rejection rate     
of 4%) (Dingjian, C., 1998). In 2006, the NPCSC 
adopted the Law of the People's Republic of China on 
the Supervision of Standing Committees of People's 
Congresses at Various Levels. It provided more 
details about the functions and powers of LPCs, 
including (1) hearing and deliberating on Special 
Work Reports of the People's Government, the 
People's Court and the People's Procuratorate; (2) 
examining and approving Final Accounts, hearing 
and deliberating the Plans for National Economy   
and Social Development and the Reports on the 
Implementation of Budgets, and hearing and delibe-
rating on Audit Reports; (3) inspecting the implemen-
tation of laws and regulations; (4) examining the 
archival filing of regulatory documents; (5) inquiry and 
interrogatory; (6) investigating special issues; and  
(6) deliberating on and deciding cases concerning 
22dismissals from office . This undoubtedly shows    
the tremendous development of LPCs and their 
strengthened role in local politics. In practice, for 
instance, due to the increasing unsatisfactory perfor-
mance, such as miscarriages of justice by some 
courts, the LPC Standing Committee vetoed the 
Work Report of People's Court, for example, at 
Hengyang city in 2007. It also vetoed the Work Report 
of Local Government, for instance, at Zhengzhou city 
in 2006 (Le, Y., 2008). Another example is that the 
LPC Standing Committee did not approve the 
appointment of the chief procurator at Bingzhou city 
according to Article 101 of the Constitution. At the 
same time, LPCs have had to pioneer “new forms” of 
strong measures that are not given in laws, instead of 
simply grumbling about problematic systems. These 
new measures include examination and appraisal    
of the responsibility system of department law 
enforcement (bumen zhifa zerenzhi), law supervision 
papers (falv jiandushu) and individual case 
supervision (gean jiandu). 
Therefore, to say that China's Constitution is merely a 
facade is mainly based on liberal views which 
assume that the courts must be at the center of the 
implementation of the Constitution (Qianfan, Z., 
2010). However, as has been illustrated above, in the 
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23 - Some scholars have attempted to illustrate the development of China's constitutionalism from non-court centered view. 
context of China, the real foundation of the State 
Constitution is not the court system but the People's 
Congress system because of its fundamental role in 
creating and maintaining other state actors, including 
the courts, in accordance with the Constitution 
23(Dowdle, M., 2002) .
2.2 Normalization of Party Constitution 
Although the State Constitution has been 
strengthened, no one can deny the fact that China    
is still a party-state where the ruling party plays          
a decisive role in practice. It is fair to say that it is 
almost impossible to understand China's constitution 
without looking at the workings of the CPC.   
2.2.1. CPC's Legitimacy Challenged 
Originally, the establishment of the CPC was facilita-
ted by the Soviet Union. However, as Lubman states, 
this changed after the Culture Revolution: 
  
China attempted to employ legislation and adminis-
trative rules as essential tools in governing China. The 
Chinese leadership, departing from their previous 
reliance on policy declarations and their disregard of 
formal legal rules, has moved to elevate such rules 
into primary sources of authority (Lubman, S., 1999).  
  
In fact, since 1978 the CPC has been transformed 
from a revolutionary party to a governing party, 
embracing the notion of socialist democracy and the 
rule of law (Duanhong, C., 2008). In this way, it has 
departed from the Soviet Union. As White points out, 
the reason for this was that Deng and his associates 
were seeking to build up the NPC. As a non-party 
organization, it was composed of socially prestigious 
individuals who would wholeheartedly support the 
party policy and work for its implementation. Through 
the NPC, the Party sought to integrate the polity and 
to organize it around the principle of one-party rule 
(Yan, L., 2015 and Xiaoli, Z., 2012). The role of the 
CPC's control over the NPC is crucial since deputies 
give voluntary assent and support to the CPC in this 
ultimate goal. However, as noted above, with the 
development of the People's Congress system, the 
CPC has inevitably had trouble in maintaining its 
discipline, and the most important leaders have 
hardly been able to maintain their unambiguous 
authority. Ironically, in the quest to legitimize its own 
authority, the CPC planted a thorn in its side which 
cannot be readily removed. In addition, different from 
the period when ideology played an important role in 
the controlling communist power, under the open-
door policy together with Western technology and 
investment came “Western bourgeois liberalism”. To 
a certain extent, the official ideology is in disarray and 
the CPC is no longer able to achieve an ideological 
consensus as Mao did. The ideological crisis is 
further exacerbated as the Party does not have a 
coherent ideology that justifies its ultimate vision, 
goals and concrete strategy in terms of Marxist 
concepts (Hu, S., 1993). 
Furthermore, Party discipline is more difficult to 
maintain as a result of a more open society, with more 
opportunities to rise up the social ladder other than 
through a career in the cadre or as a government 
employee. Party membership, which was previously 
very valuable because of its connection to a 
successful political career, has thus greatly, if not 
totally, lost its attractiveness (Dickson, B., 2014).
Indeed, how to maintain the CPC's legitimacy is a 
challenging issue since the adoption of the open  
door policy was adopted in China. Given that the  
CPC prioritizes the People's Congress system 
intentionally, the CPC has to enshrine the State 
Constitution which maintains the high profile of the 
People's Congress system. Without this, it would be 
difficult for the CPC to maintain its authority behind 
the scenes. Formally, the NPC, as the highest organ 
of state power, has its constitutional legitimacy, albeit 
a weak one, grounded in the way it allows for 
representation. However, the CPC has no such 
legitimacy in the State Constitution and only receives 
a mention in the relevant statement in the Preamble: 
“The victory in China's New-Democratic Revolution 
and the successes in its socialist cause have been 
24 - Currently, Xi Jinping is the General Secretary of the Standing Committee of the CPC's Politburo, elected in accordance with the 
Party Constitution.
25 - In addition, the People's Liberation Army is subject to the CPC's absolute leadership, and the highest authority is headed by the 
CMC of the CPC and the CMC of the State. These two, in fact, exist in the form of “one body with two names”. Regulations for the 
Chinese People's Liberation Army on Political Work (issued by the CPC's Central Committee) art. 4.
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achieved by the Chinese people of all nationalities, 
under the leadership of the Communist Party of 
China”. Of course, this cannot provide the legitimacy 
of the CPC's rule over the country after the 
Revolution. Therefore, the NPC's legitimacy, based 
on the State Constitution, is able to prevail over that 
of the CPC. Due to this, it is understandable that over 
some incidents, people could appeal to the NPC to 
challenge the CPC's rule by invoking the provisions 
and under the banner of the State Constitution; a 
situation that could lead to crisis. The CPC has, in 
fact, realized that the strengthening of the People's 
Congress system may be a threat to it if not handled 
properly. Hence, it has been attempting to normalize 
its mechanisms based on the operation of the 
People's Congress in practice. 
2.2.2.  CPC's Normalization  
A very innovative measure taken by the CPC has 
been to combine itself with, and adhere to, the 
People's Congress system. At the central level, the 
Chairman of the NPCSC (legislative branch), the 
Premier (executive branch) and others, appointed in 
accordance with the State Constitution, are members 
24of the Standing Committee of the CPC's Politburo . 
In order to reconcile the Party Constitution with the 
State Constitution, it is now a political convention for 
the Party to hold its plenary session of the National 
Congress of the CPC first in order to decide the 
composition of the Central Committee of the CPC 
(205 members and 171 alternate members) and the 
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the 
CPC (130 members); and only then to form the 
Politburo of the Central Committee (25 members), 
Central Military Commission (CMC), Standing 
Committee of the Politburo (7 members) and the 
General Secretary of the Central Committee. It has 
been a political convention that the General 
Secretary must serve as the Chairman of the Party's 
CMC concurrently. This is because the Chairman 
acts as a commander -in-chief and he can deploy 
troops, controls the country's nuclear weapons, and 
use the budget after it is approved by the NPC or 
NPCSC (Mackerras, C., 2001). This is compatible 
with the CPC's Convention which states that the: 
“Party commands the gun” (dang zhihui qiang). This 
has been legalized by Article 19 of the Law of the 
People's Republic of China on National Defence 
which stipulates that the armed forces of the PRC are 
subject to the leadership of the Communist Party of 
25  China.
During the session of the National Congress of       
the CPC, the Party is able to prepare, discuss and 
decide issues of national importance, including      
the personnel structure of the state organs, in 
accordance with the Party Constitution. It can then 
follow this up by obliging the NPC to adjust and make 
the decision formally in accordance with the State 
Constitution. 
At the beginning of the NPC's plenary session, it is the 
CPC that suggests the nominees, initially to the NPC 
Presidium, which then submits the list to the deputies 
for final discussion and decision. These nominees 
are supposed to assume the posts of new NPC, 
President, Vice-President and Chairman of the CMC 
of the State. At the initial stage of the NPC election, 
the General Secretary will be elected by deputies to 
assume the posts of President and Chairman of the 
CMC of the State. This is considered a constitutional 
convention in China. It has been recognized that the 
General Secretary of the Party should assume the 
offices of State President and Chairman of the CMC 
concurrently in order to maintain political stability as 
history shows that political tragedies, such as the 
Cultural Revolution, have their origins, to a certain 
extent, in the division of offices, the so-called “trinity 
system”. For example, Mao Zedong was Chairman of 
the Party and Chairman of the Military Commission of 
the Party, while Liu Shaoqi was  the President of the 
26 - China adopts the thin theory of rule of law. As analyzed by Peerenboom, whereas a thick theory or substantive theory of the rule 
of law would incorporate elements of political morality like the forms of government, the economic models or the various 
conceptions of human rights, a thin theory would put forward formal or instrumentalist aspects of the rule of law that would rest on a 
system of laws that are general, published, prospective, clear, coherent, applicable, stable and implemented. 
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State according to the State Constitution. Even so,    
it should be noted that the context in the era of      
Mao  was substantially different to the subsequent 
strengthening of the NPC. 
In the second stage of the plenary session of the 
NPC, it is the General Secretary of the CPC with the 
new status of State President and Chairman of the 
CMC of the State who nominates the Premier and 
Vice-Chairman and members of the CMC and 
presents these to the NPC for a decision. Meanwhile, 
the President of the SPC and Procurator General of 
the SPP are nominated by the NPC Presidium and 
presented to the NPC for a final decision. The final 
stage of the election is to form a cabinet according to 
the Premier's nominations.
Such conventions have largely reconciled the Party 
with the State without hindering the operation of the 
NPC, and all other state organs including the SPC 
and SPP have been created by the NPC according to 
the State Constitution. On the one hand, the CPC's 
involvement in the State Constitution has been 
normalized by its earlier Party congress and the 
incorporation of state cadres into the Party. The 
Premier, the leader of the highest organ of executive 
power, and the Chairman of the NPCSC – the highest 
organ of legislative power, are both members of the 
Standing Committee of the Politburo. On the other 
hand, the CPC has learned how to convert its Party's 
leadership into the State's leadership through the 
NPC according to the State Constitution. For 
example, the exercising of military power by the CPC 
before 1982 was not grounded on the State 
Constitution but rather on the Party Constitution in 
that the CPC was omnipotent over the society at that 
time. However, with the development of the rule of 
26law (Peerenboom, R., 2002) .  the State Constitution 
of 1982 established the Chairmanship of the CMC of 
the State. This allows the CPC to transfer its Party's 
role in exercising military power into a constitutional 
one by the political convention that the Chairman of 
the Party's CMC is the Chairman of the State's CMC 
concurrently. 
More importantly, the CPC has formed a convention 
on how to maintain its leadership on establishing      
or amending a Constitution in practice. This was  
seen in practice as early as 1954 where it was         
the CPC that first initiated a proposal to establish       
a Constitution. According to such a proposal,          
the Central Government decided to establish a 
Constitution-drafting Committee and proceeded 
accordingly.
At the same time, the CPC established a 
Constitution-drafting Team to draft the Constitution. 
In essence, it was the CPC's Constitution-drafting 
Team that drafted the constitution exclusively, and 
then submitted the draft to the Constitution-drafting 
Committee for a procedural follow-up (Zhiwei, T., 
2014). By analogy, in terms of constitutional 
amendments, for example, in 2004, it was the 
Standing Committee of the Politburo that decided the 
general principles on constitutional amendments 
first. In the meantime, the Chairman of the NPCSC, 
subject to the Politburo, was appointed as the head  
of the Central Constitutional Amendments Group. 
After seeking advice from opinions or recommen-
dations from local governments, non-communist 
parties' communities, experts etc., the draft proposal 
was adopted first at the plenary session of the 16th 
CPC's Central Committee. 
It was then adopted by the sixth plenary session of  
the NPCSC on the proposals by the CPC Central 
Committee, and ultimately voted on at the NPC 
session. It would appear that the CPC has played a 
dominant role by exercising its exclusive authority   
on drafting and amending the Constitution before it 
enters into legal procedures. As regards other 
statutes, due to the reinforced role of the State 
Constitution, national legislatures have become more 
autonomous and assertive since the CPC issued the 
27 - The role of PPCC has been increasingly important than expected in China's politics. 
28 -  Article 5 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1982) states: “The People's Republic of China practices ruling the 
country in accordance with the law and building a socialist country of law.”
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Central Document 8, that is, Several Opinions of the 
Central Committee on Strengthening Leadership 
over Lawmaking Work in 1991. The Document 
clearly indicates that Party leadership over the NPC 
should henceforth be rather general and not involve 
micro-management (Tanner, M., 1994). 
Subsequently, there has been a wide retreat by      
the party from the NPC's actual legislative drafting 
process, as well as from many other aspects of the 
NPC's constitutional operations (Dowdle, M., 1997). 
Certainly, this is not to deny that the CPC can still 
exercise significant influence over legislatures 
through its Politburo. 
For example, the Chairman and some Vice-
Chairmen of the NPCSC are members of and subject 
to the Politburo, and the nomenklatura system, 
namely the Party Centre's list for NPC appointments 
which includes all members of the NPCSC Party 
Group (dangzhu), plus all NPCSC members, as well 
as the leaders of all the Special Committees under 
the NPCSC. The Politburo pre-approves the final list 
of all candidates for the NPCSC (Tanner, M., 1994).
Furthermore, at the local level, it has been a common 
practice for the Party Secretary, during his/her term, 
to assume the chairmanship of the Local People's 
Congress Standing Committee. From 2013, at the 
provincial level, party secretaries of all 24 provinces 
apart from Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjing, Chongqing, 
Xinjiang, Xizang and Guangdong assume the 
chairmanship of the Local People's Congress 
Standing Committee in the same way. Such a 
practice effectively integrates the Party with the local 
government. On the one hand, this could strengthen 
the leadership of the Party over the government;     
on the other hand, it maintains the operation of the 
Local People's Congresses according to the State 
Constitution (Beijing News 2013).
Additionally, the CPC creates a consultative body      
-the People's Political Consultation Conference 
(PPCC)- to “receive societal feedback on governan-
ce, to improve the quality of public service and to 
incorporate influential social leaders into the esta-
blishment through limited political empowerment   
and controlled participation” (Xiaojun, Y., 2011). By 
involving non-Communist social elites and societal 
leaders in the PPCC, the CPC is able to create 
patron-client networks, allocate preferential 
treatment and consolidate its ties with elites and 
leaders in society. Currently, it is a political conven-
tion that the NPC holds each plenary session 
immediately following the PPCC's meeting; these   
are always mentioned in parallel as “the two 
meetings” (lianghui). In this regard, the PPCC 
plays a supplementary but essential role to that of the 
People's Congress through its participation in Party 
27and State mechanisms.
Besides the political conventions, the CPC as a ruling 
party also endeavors to comply strictly with the “rule 
of law” principle, which has been imbedded in the 
28State Constitution since 1999.  Overall, such efforts 
towards its normalization can be seen in at least three 
ways. 
Firstly, the CPC attempts to build up a systematic 
intra-party rule system which must be obeyed strictly 
in accordance with the “rule of law” principle. In 
particular, in 2013, according to the Party Constitution 
the CPC promulgated the new Regulation on Intra-
Party Rules (zhongguo gongchandang dangnei fagui 
zhiding tiaolie) in order to systematize the party rules. 
The Regulation clearly states that the enactment of 
the party rules must be in accordance with the State 
Constitution and laws which illustrates the CPC's 
insistence on the rule of law. 
Secondly, the CPC has been endeavoring to be an 
open party, especially since the Central Committee of 
the CPC issued the Resolution on Improving Party's 
Governing Capacity in 2004, stipulating that the Party 
will increase the transparency in Party affairs, and 
enhance the transparency of the Party's work so that 
29 -  Resolution on Improving Party's Governing Capacity (issued by the fourth plenary session of 16th Central Committee of the CPC 
on September 2004), sec 9, para 5.  
30 - Civil Servant Law of the People's Republic of China, art 4.
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Party members can understand and participate in 
29Party affairs.  Previously, the Party was secretive 
about its composition and operations (McGregor, R., 
2010). 
Now, the public can gain access to more and more 
resources on the Party. In an unprecedented move, 
the CPC has been increasing its transparency by 
establishing specific websites and disclosing greater 
amounts of relevant information by strictly adhering 
to the legal requirements of open government. In 
particular, the working procedures of the Party's 
Discipline Inspection Commission have become 
transparent to the public. 
Thirdly, the CPC has been positioned with the 
equivalent status of the government. In relation to 
this, the CPC is not a party in the ordinary sense of a 
political association. Some CPC departments are 
separate but with the equivalent status of the 
government while others are merged with the 
government, such as the CPC Taiwan Affairs Office 
under the Party Constitution and the Taiwan Affairs 
Office of the State Council under the State 
Constitution. Both fall within the term, “one body with 
two names” (yige jigou, liangkuai paizi). The 
personnel of CPC departments also fall within those 
who perform public duties in accordance with law and 
have been included in the state administrative staff 
whose wages and welfare are borne, in practice, by 
the state. Also, according to the Civil Servant Law of 
the People's Republic of China, it is the CPC that 
30assumes the administration of cadres.
As illustrated above, both political conventions and 
the CPC's endeavors to systematize and legalize its 
intra-party rules show the normalization of the Party 
Constitution according to the “rule of law” principle, 
thereby strengthening the Party's authority in the new 
era. 
3. Evolution of a Dual Constitution
The strengthening of the People's Congress system 
and the normalization of the CPC illustrates the 
emergence of the dual constitution in a reformed 
China, comprising the Party Constitution and the 
State Constitution. Thus, it would be unfair and 
biased to evaluate China's Constitution if either one 
was overlooked. 
However, how the dual constitution should evolve     
is another issue that needs to be addressed in the 
process of looking for the direction of Chinese 
political reform. To this end, based on the structure   
of the dual constitution, four dimensions must be 
borne in mind in order for China to achieve 
constitutionalism: dual congresses, dual judiciaries, 
dual executives and the military system.  
3.1. Dual Congresses 
The first task is to determine how to combine the 
functions of the Party Congress and the State 
Congress. In fact, the CPC has been attempting to 
adopt intra-party democracy or competitive 
mechanisms within the party since 1987 (Yongnian, 
Z., 2013). For example, the 17th National Congress 
of the CPC adopted some forms of competitive 
mechanism and enlarged the scope of competitive 
election inside the Party (Communist Party of China 
News, 2007). This shows the CPC's intention to 
legitimize its rule by incorporating some degree of 
democracy into the Party. However, this has to be 
guaranteed by upholding the State Constitution and 
the rule of law. Otherwise, as pointed out by Zheng, 
the competitive mechanism may lead to political 
chaos or tragedies, as illustrated by the case of Bo 
Xilai (Yongnian, Z., 2013). Nonetheless, the CPC's 
Congress operates not on the model of Western 
democracy but rather as an elitist democracy with an 
election being conducted after the selection process 
by the CPC. Incorporating a democratic factor inside 
the Party indicates a direction in the evolution of the 
31 - The Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments of the People's Republic of China. (2004) 
Amendment, art 21.
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Party Constitution. The experience of Vietnam has 
shown that a competitive election could be practiced 
inside the Party successfully. During the period of the 
11th National Congress of Communist Party of 
Vietnam, 175 members of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of Vietnam were elected out of 
218 candidates in 2011. The multi-candidate election 
proportion is more than 70% in terms of the election 
for members of the Politburo (International Herald 
Tribune, 2011). Accordingly, the interpellation system 
has been adopted and practiced effectively in 
Vietnam.
Comparatively, the current framework under the dual 
constitution does not hinder the CPC from being 
capable of action and judgment, capable of initiating 
its activities, and having the machinery for the 
expression of the wishes of the represented. The 
CPC may respond to these wishes unless there are 
good reasons not to, as is similarly required by a 
representative government (Pitkin, H., 1967). 
In fact, the current legal system has provided a 
framework for the CPC's integration with the People's 
Congress system. According to Article 21 of the 
Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses     
and Local People's Governments of the People's 
Republic of China (2004 Amendment), members of 
the standing committee of local people's congresses, 
the Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the people's 
congresses, Governors and Deputy Governors, 
Presidents of the People's Courts and Chief 
Procurators of the People's Procuratorates at local 
levels have to be nominated by the presidiums of the 
people's congresses at the corresponding levels or 
jointly nominated by deputies. 
For the subsequent election mechanism, thirty or 
more deputies to the people's congress at the 
provincial level, or twenty or more deputies to the 
people's congress at the prefecture level, or ten or 
more deputies to the people's congress at the   
county level may nominate, with joint signatures,   
31the candidates mentioned above . For the former 
election mechanism, as the Party Secretary assumes 
the Chair of the Local People's Congress Standing 
Committee, the way to nominate the candidate by the 
presidiums of the people's congresses is 
manipulated by the CPC virtually. However, the law 
does not close the door for the later election 
mechanism which may activate China's democracy 
incrementally. 
For instance, in 2011, Cao Tian, an influential 
Chinese writer, announced that he would run for 
mayor of Zhengzhou City as an independent 
candidate. Such action is consistent with the 
Constitution and relevant laws. However, he was 
deterred, in practice, by a tax inspection or other 
measures. Even so, with the rapid economic 
development, this sort of activity cannot hinder       
the middle class's pursuit of freedom and democracy. 
As of 7 June 2011, it is estimated that more than      
127 independent candidates in local elections had 
declared their candidacies (China: Update on the 
Independent Candidate Campaigns, 2011). 
This reflects the fact that the monopoly of the election 
by the CPC has been loosened slightly due to  
societal development. In the long run, assuming that 
the CPC continues to reform itself in relation to 
democracy and the rule of law, it will be a 
breakthrough for the CPC to embrace such a 
competitive mechanism in accordance with the 
Constitution and relevant laws. As such, it is crucial  
to encourage the CPC to reform further in order        
to maintain its political dominance in competitive 
elections. 
As it is now virtually impossible for the CPC to exist 
without the strengthened NPC, as was the case from 
the mid-1960s until the end of the Culture Revolution, 
and the issues decided by the CPC must be reviewed 
by deputies' voting in the NPC, it is inevitable that the 
CPC will allow for and defer to the development of 
NPC and local people's congress, given the 
continued smooth evolution of the dual constitution. 
At the same time, such allowance and deference may 
32 - Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Issuing the Implementation Opinions on Reforming and Improving the Judicial 
Committee System of the People's Court (2010), para 3.
33 - Ibid., para 2.
34 - In China, all decisions made by the court are issued in a collective way, i.e. judge's personal opinion does not appear in the 
decision. Rather, only names of the adjudicating judges appear in the decision. 
35 - Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Issuing the Implementation Opinions on Reforming and Improving the Judicial 
Committee System of the People's Court (2010), para 3, 4, 5.
36 -  Legislation Law of the People's Republic of China 2000, art 7, 8. 
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further strengthen the authority of the CPC as it 
conforms to the principles of democracy and the rule 
of law. 
Therefore, under the dual constitution, the reform is 
expected to move towards a situation where the 
State Constitution, as the highest law, prevails over 
the Party Constitution. In addition, the CPC can 
further strengthen its authority through its own 
reforms in accordance with the State Constitution 
and laws, thereby playing an overarching role in the 
NPC and local people's congresses. 
3.2. Dual Judiciaries 
Similarly, in a broad sense, it is possible to grasp the 
dual structure of the judiciary under the dual 
constitution. On the one hand, according to the State 
Constitution, China has a formal judicial system, 
including the courts and procuratorates. On the other 
hand, based on the Party Constitution, the Party has 
its discipline inspection system – the Discipline 
Inspection Commission, and the Political-Legal 
Committee inside the Party. 
It is a fact that, in practice, the court system can be 
manipulated by the Party. At the institutional level, the 
presidents of the courts at different levels are 
members of the Political-Legal Committee of the 
CPC concurrently. Moreover, the Adjudication 
Committee under the leadership of the President of 
the courts is “the highest judicial organization of a 
people's court, which plays an important role in 
summing up the judicial experiences and hearing 
32hard, complicated and important cases” . However, 
no specific definition of the “complicated and 
important cases” is given in practice. Therefore, due 
to the requirement for the Adjudication Committee to 
adhere to the Party's leadership on the work of 
33people's courts , such a mechanism can be used to 
review and modify the opinions of the adjudicating 
judges (Xin, H., 2012). In this way the collective 
34decision  made by the courts in China could be 
manipulated by the will of the Party if the case 
concerned gains regional or national importance in 
35the view of the Committee.  
At the same time, to a certain extent, the Party is able 
to manipulate the procuratorate in practice through  
its own extralegal discipline inspection system. In 
China's criminal justice system, for most corruption 
cases, it is the Discipline Inspection Commission of 
the CPC that first interrogates the Party members    
as cadres according to the disciplinary procedures    
of the Party, and then transfers the case to the 
procuratorate for prosecution according to legal 
procedures. 
A typical example is the case of the Party Secretary  
of Chongqing City – Bo Xilai – who was detained    
and interrogated first by the Discipline Inspection 
Commission and then transferred to the Procurato-
rate of Jinan City for prosecution in accordance with 
the law (Pei, M., 2012). Nonetheless, such extralegal 
detention (shuanggui) employed by the Discipline 
Inspection Commission is  unconstitutional, as the 
Legislation Law of the People's Republic of China, 
enacted by the NPC, stipulates that: “the following 
matters can be regulated by laws only: … (4) Crime 
and its punishment; (5) Sanctions resulting in citizens 
being deprived of their political rights, and coercive 
measures resulting in a limitation of the freedom of 
36their person” . 
The Party has realized that such extralegal practice 
may undermine its authority and it has taken many 
measures to regulate its extralegal activities inside 
the Party. For instance, “shuanggui can be used only 
37 - News of the Supreme People's Court on Issuing the Implementation Opinions on Reforming and Improving the Judicial 
Committee System of the People's Court (2010), para 2.
38 - In order to implement the Regulation and protect people's rights concerning disclosure of government information, the Supreme 
People's Court has issued the Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues concerning the Trial of Administrative Cases 
about Open Government Information (2011).
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by organs at the district level. Supervision and review 
mechanisms have also been introduced. Moreover, 
shuanggui can be sanctioned only by a plenary 
session of a commission's standing committee, and 
must be approved by organs at the provincial 
level”(Sapio, F., 2008). Thus, the number of units that 
can carry out detention has been considerably 
reduced. Furthermore, the CPC has recently decided 
to cancel such extralegal detention in the near future 
and this is to be replaced by legal detention according 
to the State Constitution and relevant laws 
(Australian Journal, 2013). Remarkably, this implies 
that the CPC's normalization is moving towards 
implementing the principle of rule of law according to 
the State Constitution. 
Interestingly, besides adherence to the Party's 
leadership, the SPC operates smoothly under the 
People's Congress system by insisting that the courts 
will “consciously accept the supervision of the 
people's congresses, safeguard the dignity and 
authority of the Constitution and laws, and safeguard 
37the legal rights and interests of the people” . In fact, 
no one can deny that, according to the Constitution 
and relevant laws, judicial independence has been 
designed under the People's Congress system, i.e., 
the court is created by and is responsible for the 
People's Congress system. 
On this point it is similar to the British parliamentary 
system. Hence, such a constitutional framework 
does provide a possibility for future judicial reform to 
restrain or even eradicate the party's manipulation or 
interference behind the scenes on the condition that 
the People's Congress system has been developed 
to the extent that the court is only responsible to it. 
However, due to the dominant influence of the Party, 
China's judicial reform is incremental, rather than a 
one-off, towards depoliticization. According to the 
newly released 4th Five-year Reform Outline for 
People's Courts (2014-2018), the ongoing judicial 
reform attempts to depoliticize and delocalize local 
courts by centralizing the nomination of judges to the 
High People's Courts at provincial level. At the same 
time, the financial and material recourses of local 
courts will be allocated directly by the provincial 
governments. At least, it shows that reform can make 
local courts more independent in accordance with the 
law, and less interfered with by the Party and local 
governments, though party politics may still have its 
place at the higher level.
The fourth plenary session of the 18th National 
Congress of the CPC has decided to focus on “the 
rule of law”. In fact, it has signaled the CPC's decision 
to improve its own regulation of the rule of law. This 
could also be seen in the Five-Year Planning Outline 
for Central Intra-Party Regulation Formulation    
Work (2013-2017) which has an emphasis on the 
rule-of-law-based party governance and intra-party 
democracy. Given that the Party continues to operate 
in accordance with the principle of rule of law, it could 
be expected that judicial reform will move in the 
direction of judicial independence stipulated by the 
State Constitution and be strengthened further 
incrementally. 
3.3.  Dual Executive and Military Systems
As to the executive system, China has consistently 
developed a law-based government since 1978    
and has had many achievements in this area. For 
example, the Regulation of the People's Republic of 
China on the Disclosure of Government Information 
in 2008 has encouraged the government to become 
more transparent. Accordingly, citizens have gained 
a legal right to apply for the disclosure of government 
38information.  In parallel, as mentioned above, the 
Party's departments are also endeavoring to operate 
based on the law. Correspondingly, relevant laws,   
for example, the Interim Provisions of the State 
Council for Veteran Cadres to Leave Their Posts in 
39 - To this point, it is argued that China could enjoy the leadership of CPC under the rule of law, but without a Western style 
democracy. 
40 - For example, the Provisions on Party Organ and Government Personnel's Personal Investment in Securities is circulated by the 
General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council jointly in 2001. 
41 - In practice, for example, in September 2004, Hu Jintao, the Chairman of the CMC of the Party granted military ranks to the military 
personnel, while Jiang Zemin was the Chairman of the CMC of the State. 
42 - In fact, it has been perceived that, in China, People's Liberation Army (PLA) has always been a branch of the ruling Communist 
Party of China (CPC). Recently, more people appealed for shifting the army's allegiance from the Party to the state. 
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Order to Rest, issued by the State Council, have  
been promulgated to regulate the activities of the 
government Party, as well as the Party (Hartcher,    
39P., 2012 and Pan Wei, P., 2009).  Meanwhile, their 
homogeneous nature can also be glimpsed by       
the common practice of general offices of the CPC 
and state administration of issuing national  
40directives jointly.  Given that the rule of law has     
been established, there will be no problem for the 
departments of the Party and the State to operate 
either separately or jointly in practice. 
Regarding the military system, the State Constitution 
has provided a constitutional framework under  
which the Chairman of the CMC of the State, elected 
by the NPC, can exercise the military power and is 
responsible to the NPC and NPCSC (article 94). It is 
the NPC that decides on questions of war and  
peace, or the NPCSC that decides, when the NPC is 
not in session, on the proclamation of a state of war   
in the event of an armed attack on the country or       
in fulfilment of international treaty obligations 
concerning common defence against aggression 
(article 62, 67). Furthermore, the President of the 
State has the power to declare a state of war and 
issue a mobilization order (article 80).
However, due to the existence of the Chairman of   
the CMC of the Party, there is a potential time interval 
during the hand-over period, i.e., the military power  
of the Party and the State (two chairmanships)     
may be exercised by two persons separately at       
41the same time . In practice, due to the dominant role 
of the CPC, the smooth transfer from the Chairman  
of the CMC of the Party to that of the State can be 
guaranteed. Meanwhile, it is a practice that two 
CMCs coexist in the form of “one body with two 
names”, i.e. with the same staff, which guarantees 
the military power to be exercised smoothly and 
integrally without any split.
Nonetheless, the constitutional role of the Chairman 
of the CMC of the State has sometimes been misused 
sometimes. For example, during the time interval in 
2013, it was the Chairman of the CMC of the Party, Xi 
Jinping, who was entitled to grant military ranks to the 
military personnel rather than the Chairman of the 
CMC of the State, Hu Jintao. This largely illustrates 
the Party's insistence on the principle of the “Party 
commands the gun”. Yet, according to the State 
Constitution, it is the Chairman of the CMC of the 
State, not of the Party, that should be strengthened in 
order to accord with the rule of law, because the 
military cannot belong to any individual or party, 
42rather, it has to be nationalized (Carter, L., 2012).
CONCLUSIONS
Since the end of Cold War, various Eastern European 
countries have embarked on different roads towards 
Western style liberal democracy. At the same time, 
over the past decades, some remaining socialist 
countries, in particular China and Vietnam, have 
undergone in-depth reforms in many fields. As 
observed, many developing countries have already 
come to understand that full-scale liberal democracy 
does not solve all their problems (Li, E., 2013). 
After more than three decades of development, 
China has witnessed its rise in a different way. At this 
moment, new futurologists may provide a number of 
alternatives to the universal concept of Western 
modernity but they have not yet grasped the essence 
of China's development from a non-liberal 
perspective, with regard to its constitutional regime. 
As illustrated above, the status quo is that a dual 
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constitution comprising the Party and the State has 
emerged, which cannot be explained merely by the 
traditional Party-state theory under which the Party 
can fully penetrate into and control the State, as 
occurred in the era of Mao Zedong.
As a result of several political incidents, namely,     
the Cultural Revolution (1967-1977) and the 
Tiananmen Incident 1989, the CPC has realized     
the importance of the People's Congress system      
in facilitating and strengthening its political rule. 
Ironically, the development of the People's Congress 
system has become a thorn in the CPC's side which 
cannot be readily removed, and, furthermore, it may 
pose some threat to the CPC as it lacks true 
legitimacy. However, the CPC has taken many 
pragmatic measures to integrate its own 
mechanisms with the People's Congress system 
through political conventions and its own 
normalization based on the rule of law. 
The emerged dual constitution maintains the smooth 
operation of the People's Congress in accordance 
with the State Constitution. Meanwhile, it opens a 
door for the further reform of the CPC. However, the 
approach is different from that of liberal democracies. 
Optimistically, based on the dual constitution, China 
is more likely to continue strengthening the People's 
Congress system by upholding the State Constitution 
while the Party Constitution, accompanied by reform 
will defer to the State Constitution. 
Specifically, the Party's congress, the quasi-judicial 
Discipline Inspection Commission inside the Party, 
the Party's departments and CMC under the Party 
Constitution can play their political role in practice, 
but should defer and be subject to the development of 
the People's Congress, the court system, the law-
based government and the CMC of the State under 
the State Constitution. Undoubtedly, it will be a 
challenge for the CPC to construct its competitive 
mechanism inside the Party. 
Comparatively speaking, the experience of Vietnam 
has shown that the Party could move towards 
democracy and maintain its leading role in the 
political system at the same time, while the National 
Assembly or Local People's Councils can operate 
smoothly in accordance with the State Constitution 
(Sidel, M., 2009). To some extent, Vietnam's reform is 
also moving towards a dual constitution. Moreover, 
after decades of Party and State reform, its 
Constitution was amended in 2013 to include the 
Party's leadership and it could be seen that the CPV 
was a force leading the State and society. However, 
all Party organizations operate within the framework 
of the Constitution and the law. Such a practice, at 
least, can signal the possibility that China is moving 
forward under a dual constitution.
It is widely perceived that China continues to fulfill its 
grand aspirations in its economy through in-depth 
reform; however, at the same time it is encountering 
nagging political uncertainties (Callahan, W., 2013). 
Although it must be borne in mind that “prediction is 
hazardous, particularly about the future”(Tushnet, M., 
2003), by relying on the emerged dual constitution it 
appears that there is a way for China to move forward 
incrementally but, to a great extent, not based on the 
Western experience which definitely cannot be 
guaranteed.
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